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EPORTED Texas court decisions revealed only limited substantive
changes in the area of creditor and consumer rights in 1984. The
reported decisions primarily concerned the application of existing
law to new factual situations, with the greatest amount of litigation occur-
ring in the area of borrowers' rights under the Consumer Credit Code and in
the area of creditors' ancillary remedies in enforcing their claims.
I. THE CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
During the 1984 survey period, one reported decision by the Texas
Supreme Court and several reported decisions by courts of appeals addressed
issues arising under the Texas Consumer Credit Code' (Credit Code) con-
cerning the construction of contracts, the application of the doctrine of de
minimis non curat lex, and the liability of holders and assignees of retail
installment contracts to the original consumers.
A. Construction of Contracts
In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann2 the Texas Supreme Court
held in a divided opinion that a creditor had contracted to collect an
unearned time price differential3 of more than twice that article 6.02 of the
Credit Code allows,4 and imposed statutory penalties on the creditor pursu-
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1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to -51.19 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp.
1971-1985) is commonly referred to as the Texas Consumer Credit Code, and all references
herein, unless otherwise noted, are made thereto.
2. 668 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1984).
3. Time price differential is defined in article 5069-6.01(h) of the Credit Code as the
amount "paid or payable for the privilege of purchasing goods or services to be paid for by the
buyer in installments over a period of time." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01(h)
(Vernon 1971).
4. Id. art. 5069-6.02(9)(a) provides that a seller or holder may
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ant to sections 8.015 and 8.026 of the Credit Code.7 Schuenemann is note-
worthy because it required the court to construe an agreement between the
parties to a home construction contract consisting of three separate docu-
ments: a "Building Contract", an "Installment Mechanic's Note," and a
"Mechanic's Lien Contract With Power Of Sale"; at least one of the instru-
ments arguably characterized the transaction as not requiring payment of
unearned time price differential on default.8 The majority noted, however,
that when "the default maturity clauses in the installment note and lien con-
tract unambiguously call for the collection of unearned time price differen-
tial,"9 the offending documents were not saved by language in the Building
Contract that arguably described a contrary intent.10
The court acknowledged that the creditor made no attempt to accelerate
the indebtedness and no intent was shown actually to charge the forbidden
rate, but noted that merely contracting for the usurious time price differen-
tial triggered the Credit Code penalties.l" The court recognized that instru-
ments "executed at the same time, for the same purpose, and in the course of
the same transaction are to be construed together" as an entire agreement,' 2
charge, collect and receive a time price differential which shall not exceed an
amount determined in accordance with the following schedule:
(i) On so much of the principal balance as does not exceed Five Hundred
Dollars, Twelve Dollars per One Hundred Dollars per annum;
(ii) On so much of the principal balance as exceeds Five Hundred Dollars,
but is not in excess of One Thousand Dollars, Ten Dollars per One Hundred
Dollars per annum;
(iii) On so much of the principal balance as exceeds One Thousand Dollars,
Eight Dollars per One Hundred Dollars per annum.
5. Id. art. 5069-8.01(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985) states that violation of the
Consumer Credit subtitle by "contracting for, charging or receiving interest, time price differ-
ential or other charges" greater than the amount authorized shall subject the violator to forfei-
ture of "twice the amount of interest or time price differential and default and deferment
charges contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorneys' fees fixed by the court."
6. Article 5069-8.02 of the Credit Code provides that any violation arising under article
5069-8.01(a) that involves interest, time price differential, and other charges that aggregate to
more than double the total amount authorized by the Credit Code shall cause the violator to
forfeit "as an additional penalty all principal or principal balance, as well as all interest or time
price differential, and all other charges, and shall pay reasonable attorneys' fees actually in-
curred by the obligor in enforcing the provisions of this Article." Id. art. 5069-8.02.
7. 668 S.W.2d at 329.
8. The building contract contained the following language:
The promissory note and (MORTGAGE), (DEED TO SECURE DEBT),
(DEED OF TRUST), shall have customary covenants and conditions included
therein and shall bear interest from maturity at the rate of 6% per annum until
paid and shall provide that in event of default in payment of any installment
provided for hereunderfor a period of thirty (30) days, the holder thereof may at
its option declare all of the remainder of said debt immediately due and collecti-
ble and any failure to exercise said option shall not constitute a waiver of the
right to exercise the same at any other time.
Id. at 327 (emphasis by court).
9. Id. at 329.
10. Id. at 330. The court noted that the parties had not intended the building contract to
determine their rights and duties upon acceleration of the obligation; rather, the "provision
merely states what shall be provided in other instruments in the event the Schuenemanns de-
fault in payment .... Id. (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 328.
12. Id. at 327.
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and also acknowledged the rule requiring that an allegedly usurious contract
be construed as complying with the law if reasonably possible.13 The court
held, however, that because the default maturity clauses of the note and the
lien contract provided for acceleration of the note rather than the debt 4 and
only the building contract disclosed the fact that part of the payments repre-
sented in the note reflected time price differential, applying the severe statu-
tory penalties in this instance was consistent with the legislative intent to
protect consumers from being deceived into believing that creditors lawfully
could collect unearned time price differentials upon acceleration of their
obligations. 1-
In a case involving another multi-instrument contract, Carbajal v. Ford
Motor Credit Co.,' 6 the court deemed an alleged defect in an automobile
sales contract cured by the language of a separate instrument executed as
part of the same transaction. In Carbajal the automobile purchaser sued the
defendant creditor for violations of the Credit Code, alleging that the sales
contract failed to disclose clearly and conspicuously, as required by section
7.06 of the Credit Code, a requirement that the purchaser maintain physical
damage insurance. 17 The Carbajal court ruled that the second instrument,
13. Id. at 332.
14. The note provided:
[I1n the event of default in payment of any installment for a period of thirty days,
the holder of this note may, at its option, declare all the remainder of said install-
ments due and said note will mature and it shall at once become due and payable
and the Mechanic's Lien or the Deed of Trust Lien herein mentioned, either or
both, shall become subject to foreclosure proceedings, as the holder may elect.
Id. at 327-28 (emphasis by court). Similar language in the lien contract provided that:
Should owners make default in the punctual payment of said note, or any part
thereof, as the same becomes due and payable. . . the holder of said note may,
at his option, declare the entire remaining unpaid balance of said note immedi-
ately due, and, if not immediately paid then in that event the Trustee or his
successor is hereby authorized and empowered to sell said property.
Id. at 328 (emphasis by court).
15. Id. at 332-33. Three justices dissented in the Schuenemann decision. The dissenting
justices indicated that, in light of the rule requiring that the court construe documents together
and the presumption that the parties intended to obey the law and to enter into a non-usurious
contract, the court should have interpreted the transaction in question as not providing for the
acceleration of unearned time price differential, particularly between the original parties to the
agreement. Id. at 334-36.
16. 658 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
17. TEx. REV. CIV, STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.06(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985) pro-
vides that:
When insurance is required in connection with such a contract or agreement
made under this Chapter, the seller or holder shall furnish the borrower a state-
ment which shall clearly and conspicuously state that insurance is required in
connection with the contract, and that the buyer shall have the option of fur-
nishing the required insurance either through existing policies of insurance
owned or controlled by him or of procuring and furnishing equivalent insurance
coverages through any insurance company authorized to transact business in
Texas. . . . Such statement or statements may be made in conjunction with or
as part of the retail installment contract required by Article 7.02 or may be
made in a separate written statement or statements.
Mr. Carbajal alleged that the retail installment contract did not comply with the requirements
of article 7.06(3) because it contained a paragraph entitled "OPTIONAL INSURANCE" that
created confusion regarding the buyer's obligation to insure the vehicle purchased, as previ-
ously held in Portland Tradewinds Ford v. Lugo, 613 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
1985]
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which clearly set forth the insurance requirement, cured any confusion over
insurance requirements created by the retail installment contract itself.' 8
The debtor in Carbajal also alleged that the creditor violated the Credit
Code by failing to notify the debtor of certain defective language in the retail
installment contract within sixty days after actually discovering the statu-
tory violation as required by section 8.01(c)(1) of the Credit Code. ' 9 In de-
ciding that Ford timely gave appropriate corrective notice, the court noted
that Ford previously had been a party to lawsuits wherein appellate court
decisions had split regarding the legality of the clause in question.20 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that Ford did not actually discover that the language
in question violated the Credit Code until the Texas Supreme Court resolved
the issue and that Ford mailed the appropriate corrective notice within sixty
days thereafter. 2 '
In Tradewinds Ford Sales, Inc. v. Paiz22 a creditor automobile seller un-
successfully appealed a decision that language in a retail installment sales
contract that prohibited a buyer from transferring his interest in the prop-
erty violated section 7.03(5) of the Credit Code, which entitles retail pur-
chasers to transfer their rights upon written consent of the seller.2 3 The
seller argued that a separate contractual clause providing for subsequent
modification of the contract in writing furnished the buyer with protection
equivalent to that provided by the statute. 24 The court noted that "a seller
Christi 1981, no writ). The Carbajal court distinguished the case at bar from Lugo, however,
because in Carbajal a second form that expressly stated that the installment contract required
the vehicle to be continuously covered by property damage insurance was provided to and
executed by the buyer. 658 S.W.2d at 285.
18. 658 S.W.2d at 285.
19. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985)
provides that:
A person has no liability to an obligor for a violation of this Subtitle or of Chap-
ter 14 of this Title if within 60 days after having actually discovered such viola-
tion such person corrects such violation as to such obligor by performing the
required duty or act or by refunding any amount in excess of that authorized by
law; provided, however, that such person gives written notice to such obligor of
such violation prior to such obligor having given written notice of or having filed
an action alleging such violation of this Subtitle or of Chapter 14 of this Title.
20. 658 S.W.2d at 283. The clause, the waiver portion of which ultimately was found to
violate public policy and the Credit Code, provided that "[a]ny personalty in or attached to the
Property when repossessed may be held by Seller without liability and Buyer shall be deemed
to have waived any claim thereto unless written demand by certified mail is made upon Seller
within 24 hours after repossession." Id.
Prior appellate court decisions regarding the legality of the waiver provision included Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. McDaniel, 613 S.W.2d 513, 515-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref d n.r.e.) (finding a violation), and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Zapata, 605 S.W.2d
362, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980) (finding no violation in the clause), rev'd, 615
S.W.2d 198 (Tex.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1024 (1981).
21. 658 S.W.2d at 284.
22. 662 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.03(5) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985)
states that "[a] buyer under a retail installment contract may, upon written consent of the
holder, transfer his equity in a motor vehicle at any time to another person .... " The of-
fending language of the contract in question provided that the "[b]uyer shall not transfer or
otherwise dispose of any interest in this contract or the Property." 662 S.W.2d at 165.
24. Paragraph 20 of the contract provided that "[t]his contract constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties and no modification hereof shall be valid in any event, and
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has a duty to prepare a contract in accordance with the standards estab-
lished by the Texas Consumer Credit Code" and may not prohibit what the
Credit Code expressly allows. 25
The factual situation in the Tradewinds Ford Sales decision, however, is
difficult to distinguish from the same court's decision in Lundquist Buick-
Opel, Inc. v. Wikoff.26 In Lundquist a clause in the contract expressly pro-
hibited the debtor from asserting claims and defenses he might have against
the secured party's assignee except as granted in the security agreement.2 7
The court held that the clause did not violate the Credit Code because a
reasonable construction of the security agreement granted the buyer the
right to assert against the seller and any assignee all the claims and defenses
available to the buyer under Texas law despite the express limiting
language. 28
B. Application of the De Minimis Doctrine
Another issue raised in the Lundquist decision concerned whether defend-
ant automobile dealer's failure to disclose a two dollar state inspection fee in
the retail installment contract so violated the requirements of article
7.02(6)(c) of the Credit Code as to justify imposition of statutory penalties.29
Buyer expressly waives the right to rely thereon, unless made in writing signed by Seller." 662
S.W.2d at 165.
25. Id.
26. 659 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
27. The clause appears to violate TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07 (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1971-1985), which provides:
No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall:
(4) Provide for a waiver of the buyer's rights of action against the seller or
holder or other person acting therefor for any illegal act committed in the col-
lection of payments under the contract or agreement or in the repossession of a
motor vehicle;
(6) Provide that the buyer agrees not to assert against the seller or holder of
[sic] any claim or defense arising out of the sale.
28. The court determined that the following provision in the contract was sufficient to
cure any violation of the Credit Code caused by the apparent waiver of defenses. 659 S.W.2d
at 468-69. The contract provided that: "ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED
PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Id. at 468. The provi-
sion is required by the FTC. See infra note 38.
29. 659 S.W.2d at 468. Article 5069-7.02(6)(c) provides that "[tihe retail installment
contract shall specifically set out. . . [a]ny itemized charges, as defined in Article 7.01." TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.02(6)(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985). Article 5069-
7.01(g) provides that for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales chapter, itemized
charges means those amounts included in the cash price for charges related to:
(i) any registration, certificate of title, and license fees;
(ii) any taxes;
(iii) any other fees or charges that are set or prescribed by law, that are not
more than the amounts allowed by law, and that are connected with the sale or
inspection of a motor vehicle; and
(iv) any charges permitted by Article 7.06 for insurance, service contracts,




The lower court imposed the statutory penalties on the seller, and the
Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed, holding that although nondisclo-
sure of the two dollar inspection fee technically violated the statute, recovery
under the statute was not authorized under the doctrine of de minimis non
curat lex.30
The San Antonio court of appeals adopted a contrary position on the ap-
plicability of the de minimis doctrine in Vela v. Yates Ford, Inc.31 In Vela
the creditor had overcharged the debtor $2.83 in financing charges because it
calculated the number of "odd days" 32 on the contract by a procedure au-
thorized by Regulation Z of the Code of Federal Regulations 33 rather than
by the procedures set forth in the Credit Code. 34 In refusing to apply the de
minimis doctrine, the San Antonio court noted that the de minimis doctrine
applies only when the gist of the action is damages, and not when the pur-
pose of the action is to penalize statutorily proscribed conduct. 35 Recogniz-
ing that the Lundquist court, among others, had applied the de minimis
doctrine to deny recovery under the Credit Code, the Vela court observed
that "such holdings frustrate the express intent of the statute and leave the
consumer without the remedy contemplated by the legislature."' 36
C. Liability of Subsequent Holders and Assignees
The penalties set forth in the Credit Code apply to subsequent holders and
assignees of contracts prescribed by the Credit Code as well as to the original
parties thereto. In De La Fuente v. Homes Savings Association37 the holder
30. 659 S.W.2d at 468 (citing Wayne Strand Pontiac-GMC v. Molina, 653 S.W.2d 45, 47
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("The doctrine stands for the proposition
that '[t]he law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters.' ")).
31. 675 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ granted).
32. "Odd days" are days in addition to one month's time for which a creditor is allowed
to charge a finance charge on a retail installment contract when the first payment does not fall
due exactly one month from the date of the contract. Thus, if the first installment payment on
a contract is due more than one month beyond the contract date, the additional days beyond
one month are considered "odd days." See id. at 234.
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 226, app. J(b)(5)(ii) (1984). The procedure for determining the
number of odd days set forth in Appendix J of Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z requires
subtracting a calendar month from the installment payment date; the odd days are those days
remaining prior to the first monthly interval. Thus, for a contract executed on February 28,
1983, with a first installment due on April 2, 1983, there would be two odd days using the
procedure authorized by Regulation Z. This figure is derived by first subtracting one calendar
month from the payment due date, providing the date March 2, 1983, for calculating the odd
days. The odd days are those between February 28, 1983, and March 2, 1983, thus producing
an odd days figure of two in this example. (Note that March 2 is included as an odd day).
34. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.010) (Vernon 1971) provides that
"'[m]onth' means that period of time from one date in a calendar month to the corresponding
date in the following calendar month .... " In the example set forth in the preceding note, a
contract executed on February 28, 1983, with a first payment due on April 2, 1983, would have
five odd days if odd days were computed as the number of days beyond one month from the
contract date to the first scheduled installment date, under the method derived from Texas
statutes. See 675 S.W.2d at 236; TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.03(4) (Vernon
1971). Similar variations in the number of odd days computed by the two methods result for
periods overlapping the ends of other calendar months.
35. 675 S.W.2d at 237.
36. Id. at 237-38.
37. 669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
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of a promissory note for the sale and installation of aluminum siding, who
had purchased the note in good faith and for value, sued for collection upon
default. The consumer counterclaimed alleging violations of the Credit
Code in the underlying contract. The creditor defended the counterclaim in
part by asserting that even if the contract violated the Credit Code, the cred-
itor was not liable because of its status as a holder in due course. In revers-
ing the lower court's judgment for the creditor, the appellate court stated
that when the subject note contained the notice to holders required by fed-
eral law, the holder in due course doctrine was abolished in consumer credit
transactions. 38 The court reasoned that by promulgating this notice require-
ment, the Federal Trade Commission clearly had intended to place the bur-
den for losses occasioned by sellers' misconduct on the holder of the paper.39
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Soto4° the court held the holder of an automo-
bile retail installment contract liable for violations of its continuing obliga-
tion to disclose changes in physical damage insurance coverage. 41 In Soto an
automobile dealer sold a new car to Mr. Soto and, at Mr. Soto's request,
arranged for physical damage insurance on the vehicle to be provided at
rates approved by the State Board of Insurance. The seller subsequently
assigned the contract to Ford, and the seller had no further involvement
with the contract. Upon later review of the buyer's driving record, a third-
party insurance broker learned that the buyer did not qualify for insurance
coverage at the rates fixed or approved by the State Board of Insurance. The
broker, retroactively and without notifying the buyer, changed the insurance
policy to a company handling higher risk policies whose rates were not fixed
or approved by the State Board of Insurance.
The buyer subsequently sued the seller and Ford for failure to provide him
with notice of the higher insurance rate and with a ten-day option to procure
38. Id. at 141. The note in question contained the following notice set forth in bold face
type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-
JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF
Id. This language is prescribed by the FTC at 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1984), which provides that:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in or
affecting commerce as 'commerce' is defined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5
of that Act for a Seller directly or indirectly, to: (a) Take or receive a consumer
credit contract which fails to contain the [above quoted] provision in at least ten
point, bold face type ....
39. 669 S.W.2d at 142. The Seller's misconduct in this instance consisted of contracting
to receive a first lien trust deed on the consumer's residence to secure the value of home im-
provements in violation of article 5069-6.05(7) of the Credit Code. The De La Fuente court
noted that language in the Lundquist opinion, supra notes 26-28, indicates that the assignee of
a seller is entitled to holder in due course status. 669 S.W.2d at 141 n.2. The De La Fuente
court distinguished the language used in Lundquist, however, and stated that "the holder of a
note subject to the Credit Code has an independent duty to ensure that the retail installment
contract conforms to the statutory requirements of the Credit Code." Id. at 142.
40. 671 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 624.
1985]
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alternative insurance as required by section 7.06(3) of the Credit Code.42
The seller and Ford argued that they met the statutory notice requirement
when the approved insurance policy was placed in effect at the time the con-
tract was executed and that the statute did not require them to provide no-
tice to the buyer several months later when the insurance coverage was
changed unilaterally without their knowledge. The court held that Ford, as
holder of the contract, was the only party liable to the buyer, noting that in
this case the holder, and not the seller, was the party directly responsible for
maintenance of the ongoing transaction. 43 Ford, therefore, had a continuing
duty under section 7.06(3) to disclose any changes in insurance to nonfixed
or nonapproved rates to the buyer and to provide him with the opportunity
to acquire insurance at better terms."
II. USURY
With one exception, the Texas courts did not chart new ground in inter-
preting the state's usury laws. That exception, Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold,45
requires Texas courts to construe strictly the usury laws whenever refinanc-
ing is conditioned upon the assumption of third-party debt by the bor-
rower. 46 The holding, which evoked strong dissent in the court,47 effectively
banishes such a refinancing tool as an alternative to which lenders may turn.
Alamo Lumber involved a promissory note executed by Gold payable to a
financial institution in the amount of $75,000, against which interest of over
$7,000 had accrued. The transaction upon which this note was based and
the note itself were not usurious. Gold secured repayment of the note by
pledging certain realty. Upon Gold's default, the bank instituted foreclosure
proceedings in a collection effort. At a time when the foreclosure was immi-
nent, Gold's son was indebted to Alamo Lumber on an unsecured open ac-
count in an amount exceeding $23,000. To thwart the impending
foreclosure, Gold convinced Alamo Lumber to purchase the noteholder's
position. In exchange Gold assumed her son's obligations to Alamo Lumber
by the execution of a promissory note, roughly equaling the open account
indebtedness. The realty that secured the original $75,000 promissory note
also secured the repayment of this second notes. Alamo extended the due
42. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.06(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985) pro-
vides that if any insurance that is sold or procured by the seller or holder is obtained at a
premium or rate of charge not approved by the State Board of Insurance, the seller must notify
the buyer in writing. The buyer then has a 10-day option to procure alternate insurance.
43. 671 S.W.2d at 624.
44. Id. at 625. The court limited imposition of the continuing duty of disclosure to Ford
Motor Credit Company in this case because, after initially placing the purchaser on binder
coverage at the time the retail installment contract was executed, the seller was totally re-
moved from maintenance of the ongoing, continuing retail installment contract transaction.
Furthermore, the holder, not the seller, was the only party involved at the time of the subse-
quent policy change.
45. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
46. Id. at 928.
47. See id. at 928 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
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dates of the obligations evidenced by the two notes. Neither note was usuri-
ous on its face.
Gold, the maker of the two notes, commenced an action against Alamo
Lumber and argued that by conditioning the refinancing of the $75,000 note
on the assumption of her son's indebtedness to Alamo, Alamo had charged
additional interest in an amount equal to the assumed indebtedness. That
indebtedness, when factored as interest on the $75,000 debt extended, far
exceeded the maximum amount allowed by law, constituted interest double
the maximum amount permitted, and resulted in Alamo suffering the maxi-
mum penalties under article 5069-1.06 of the Credit Code. 48 The court dis-
tinguished the Alamo Lumber transaction from those instances in which a
borrower is required to pay one of its own debts as a condition to making a
loan, which the Court impliedly approved.49
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Barrow disputed the court's reliance on Laid
Rite, Inc. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,50 which the dissent found to have misap-
plied fundamental usury principles." Specifically, the dissent noted that
neither note was usurious on its face, which under the authority of Walker v.
Temple Trust Co.52 required the trial court to inquire as to the intent of the
parties.53 The majority's holding totally eviscerated without explanation the
issue of intent and therefore abandoned a long line of Texas jurisprudence.5 4
48. The penalties imposed upon Alamo Lumber were severe. Specifically Alamo forfeited
$82,925.34 due it on the first note, forfeited $30,893.10 represented by the second note, suf-
fered a cancellation of the liens securing the two notes in question, and suffered a judgment for
double the amount of interest (which, because it included the $30,893.10 deemed interest,
constituted $45,177.90 at the time of trial) plus $25,000 in attorneys' fees. Although the deci-
sion of the court is not abundantly clear in all respects, apparently by its effort to secure the
original $23,522.80, Alamo suffered an out of pocket loss of $229,174.24.
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1985) provides
that "[a]ny person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than the
amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor three times the amount of usuri-
ous interest ...... No penalty is assessed for any "usurious interest which results from an
accidental and bona fide error." Id.
Id. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971) provides for forfeiture of the principal if the usurious
interest exceeds double the legal rate.
49. 661 S.W.2d at 928. The court's holding, in which it impliedly condones requiring a
borrower to pay off indebtedness as a condition to making a loan, does not address the situa-
tion in which a lender requires a payoff even though the borrower is current on all its obliga-
tions. Clearly, a lender can expect a borrower in default to pay its obligation as a precondition
to making a loan. The nondefaulting borrower situation, however, is much closer to the Alamo
Lumber fact situation and should be pursued with utmost care and caution.
50. 512 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
51. 661 S.W.2d at 928 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
52. 124 Tex. 575, 578, 80 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1935).
53. 661 S.W.2d at 929.
54. See, e.g., Carbajal v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 658 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (court required contract terms to expressly and posi-
tively evidence intent); Rotello v. International Harvester Co., 624 S.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (buyer must show that exaction of usurious interest is
seller's dominant purpose and intention); Prestonview Co. v. State Mutual Investors, 581
S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court required showing of
intent to assess usurious interest); American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center,
Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (transaction not
usurious unless the lender supposed and intended it so); Hernandez v. United States Fin. Co.,
441 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (contract not usurious
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A second criticism addressed the majority's failure to acknowledge the new
consideration given by Alamo. The dissent's review of Laid Rite concluded
tha the court in Laid Rite incorrectly paraphrased Vee Bee Service Co. v.
Household Finance Corp.5" and other cases56 to hold that any assumption of
third-party debt must be included in computing interest. 57 Justice Barrow
noted the exact language of Vee Bee, which stated:
[W]here a borrower is required, as a condition of the loan, to assume
or pay, in whole or part, the debt of another, in addition to legal inter-
est, the transaction is usurious, unless the borrower receives something of
benefit for the additional assumption or payment, aside from the use of
the money loaned.58
The dissent concluded that additional consideration was present in the facts
of Alamo Lumber and, therefore, a finding of usury was not supportable.5 9
The majority never reached the issue of consideration, as its holding con-
strued all third-party debt assumptions as questionable subject only to the
mathematical calculations necessary to determine whether the interest ceil-
ing had been exceeded. 6°
Two cases addressed the recurring question of whether judicially related
action specifying that an amount is owed constitutes "charging." In Austin
Elcon Corp. v. Avco Corp.61 a federal district court construed Texas law to
hold that submitting documents to a court during litigation to show money
owed on the claim does not amount to "unilaterally placing on an account
an amount due as interest" 62 and, therefore, does not constitute charging of
interest. 63 Undaunted, however, the court went on to add that because in
the facts of the case all prelitigation billings were devoid of interest charges,
any claim in litigation that could be construed as interest should be con-
strued as a request for prejudgment interest.64 Persuasive in the court's ad-
ditional reasoning was the oft cited rule that a federal court may look to
on its face will not be held usurious absent intention); Sinclair v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 355
S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court required show-
ing of intent).
55. 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affid, 269 A.D. 772, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1945).
56. See Darden v. Schuessler, 154 Ala. 372, 377-78, 45 So. 130, 131 (1907) (court found
usury when the borrower received nothing of benefit other than money loaned); Winder Nat'l
Bank v. Graham, 38 Ga. App. 552, 144 S.E. 357, 358 (1928) (same); Canal-Commercial Trust
& Sav. Bank v. Brewer, 143 Miss. 146, 108 So. 424, 429 (1926) (lack of any consideration
renders contract usurious); Ferdon v. Zarriello Bros., 87 N.J. Super. 124, 208 A.2d 186, 189
(Law Div. 1965) (transaction is usurious unless supported by consideration other than money
newly loaned); Janes v. Felton, 99 W. Va. 407, 129 S.E. 482, 484 (1925) (same).
57. 661 S.W.2d at 931.
58. Id. (emphasis by court) (quoting Vee Bee, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 602).
59. 661 S.W.2d at 932. Although the holding in Alamo Lumber does not go so far as
specifically to include third-party guarantees within the ambit of forbidden transactions, the
court's decision does not rule out the proposition that requiring a guaranty of a third party's
debt could constitute charging.
60. Id. at 928.
61. 590 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
62. Id. at 517 (quoting Rheiner v. Varner, 627 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981,
no writ)).
63. 590 F. Supp. at 517.
64. Id.
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state law " 'as a matter of convenience and practicality' to determine the
appropriate remedy." 65 The court noted that the cause of action involved the
federal Miller Act 66 and as a federal action the state's penalty laws were not
mandatory. 67 The decision in Austin Elcon cited with approval 68 the case of
Tyra v. Bob Carroll Construction Co.,69 which held that a pleading seeking
interest does not in and of itself constitute charging. 70 Austin Elcon's em-
brace of Tyra should be viewed with some temperance due to its posture as
an action under the federal Miller Act.71 The holding in Austin Elcon is
contrary to the decision of Nationwide Financial Corp. v. English,72 but, due
to its Miller Act connections, does not overrule English.
Dryden v. City National Bank 73 illustrates the limitations of the Tyra im-
munity. In Dryden a bank made demand on the debtor for an amount that
did not credit the debtor for payments previously made. Later when the
bank filed suit to follow up on the demand, it gave credit to the debtor for all
previous payments. The court refused to characterize the demand as less
than a unilateral act to collect an amount due as interest and found such to
be charging, notwithstanding the correction ultimately made in the plead-
ings. 74 The court's holding focused on the unilateral act of the creditor's
demand for the entire debt involved, not just the debt due, and concluded
that the excess demanded was interest.75 In so holding, the court reaffirmed
a long line of Texas cases that leave little room for the erring creditor to
correct its mistake.76 Dryden is distinguishable from Tyra due to the nature
of the unilateral act involved, but intellectually the two cases are not so eas-
ily distinguished.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals discussed the difficulty in proving a
mistake in charging in Perez v. Hernandez.77 In that case a promissory note
65. Id. The court cited the case of United States ex rel. Georgia Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v.
United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 656 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1981) as authority.
66. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1982). The Miller Act concerns the bonds required of
contractors of public buildings or works.
67. 590 F. Supp. at 517.
68. Id.
69. 618 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981), afl'd, 639 S.W.2d 690 (1982) (a
pleading seeking interest did not constitute charging of usurious interest when plaintiff had not
sought to charge interest prior to litigation).
70. 618 S.W.2d at 856.
71. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1982).
72. 604 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, cause dism'd as moot) (original coun-
terclaim seeking to recover unearned interest amounted to usury).
73. 666 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 220-21.
75. Id. at 221.
76. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. 1977) (test of alleged
usury is not concerned with which party to transaction originated the allegedly usurious provi-
sions); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 136, 137
(Tex. 1974) (per curiam) (reduction of final sum paid does not render a contract usurious on its
face non-usurious); Rick Furniture Distrib. Co. v. Kirlin, 634 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (filing petition demanding payment of unearned time price differ-
ential is charging); Nationwide Fin. Corp. v. English, 604 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1980, writ dism'd) (original counterclaim seeking to recover unearned interest amounted
to usury).
77. 658 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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called for an interest rate of seven percent per annum. Contrary to the rate
in the note, a payment by the maker resulted in an interest rate of 21.29%
being paid to the payee. The payment was based upon a calculation made by
a legal secretary. At trial the payee attempted to show that the legal secre-
tary's law firm actually represented the maker and, therefore, any improper
calculation was not attributable to the payee. On appeal the payee aban-
doned this argument and adopted accidental and bona fide error as his de-
fense. 78 The court of appeals noted that in order to avoid liability for usury
because of a mistake, the lender must plead, prove, and obtain a finding from
the trial court that an accidental and bona fide error occurred. 79 The payee
did not satisfy any of these requirements and, consequently, the court over-
ruled the payee's point of error.80 The court further concluded that even if
the legal secretary's law firm represented the maker of the note, the penalty
provisions of Texas usury statutes are applicable to any party who receives
interest greater than the lawful amount.8 1 The strict liability standard, ap-
plicable whenever excessive interest is actually received, is stern warning to
lenders to exercise caution in delegating responsibility for calculating
interest.
In Robinson v. Rudy8 2 the court addressed the question of whether litiga-
tion settled by the defendant's execution of a promissory note could subject
the plaintiff to a claim of usury. In that case Robinson had executed a prom-
issory note in the amount of $20,000 in settlement of litigation initiated for
alleged damage to the plaintiff in an amount exceeding $38,000. The alleged
damages arose out of a business transaction in which Robinson received
$15,000 from Rudy as a contribution to a joint venture. After Robinson
defaulted on the $20,000 note, Rudy sued Robinson again and obtained a
summary judgment. In defense against Rudy's n'otion for summary judg-
ment Robinson alleged that the promissory note was usurious because it pro-
vided for a charge of $5,000 on the $15,000 originally advanced by Rudy.
The note was not usurious on its face. The trial court and appellate court
rejected Robinson's argument and concluded that the transaction by which
the original advance was made was not a loan and involved a business ven-
ture pursuant to which, absent Robinson's wrongdoing, no absolute obliga-
tion to repay arose.8 3 The court noted that as a business transaction both
Rudy and Robinson assumed the risk of business failure.8 4 Because the note
was not usurious on its face and because a usurious contract is one for "(1) a
loan of money (2) where the borrower has an absolute obligation to repay
the principal and (3) the lender exacts a greater compensation than allowed
78. Id. at 701.
79. Id.; see Cochran v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 586 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex. 1979)
(per curiam).
80. 658 S.W.2d at 702.
81. Id.
82. 666 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
83. Id. at 510.
84. Id.
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by law for the use of the money,"8 5 the facts in Robinson v. Rudy were defi-
cient in two respects. The validity of the note caused the trial court to look
beyond the note to determine if the transaction was usurious, and the court
found the transaction to pass muster.8 6 Although the court found no usury
in Robinson v. Rudy, a settlement of litigation clearly can result in usury if
the note executed is usurious on its face.
III. EXEMPT PROPERTY
In 1984 the Fifth Circuit clarified the domains of the state and federal
regulations governing exemptions in bankruptcy. The federal court stated in
Allen v. Hale County State Bank 87 that section 522 of the Bankruptcy
Code88 allowed states the option to "remain silent and allow federal law to
be the sole remedy, [to] draft an exemption schedule which partially or
wholly precludes the [Bankruptcy Code] remedy, [or to] allow election be-
tween state and federal exemption provisions." '89 Texas law allows an elec-
tion and also allows spouses to elect separate exemptions.90 In Allen a
married couple filed a joint bankruptcy petition and elected separate exemp-
tions. The wife chose the state exemptions but sought also to employ section
522(0 of the Bankruptcy Code9 ' to avoid a lien on her property. The Fifth
Circuit held that subsection (f) "merely gives the debtor the power to avoid a
lien on property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled under [section] 522(b)."'92 The Texas
statute does not exempt property subject to a secured lien, and the court held
that the federal exemption provision does not preempt the Texas statute. 93
The debtors in Reagan v. Austin Municipal Federal Credit Union94 also
chose state law exemptions and then tried to use section 522 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to prevent property from becoming part of the bankruptcy es-
tate as defined in section 541. 9 5 The property concerned was the wife's
retirement fund account that secured a credit plan at the credit union. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that because Texas law does not exempt retirement
funds and because the debtor did not choose the federal exemptions afforded,
85. Id. at 509; see Redman Indus. v. Couch, 613 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. 666 S.W.2d at 510.
87. 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 729 F.2d 1459 (5th Cir. 1984).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
89. 725 F.2d at 292.
90. Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 588, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1627, 1628, repealed by Act
of June 19, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3729 (enacting the Property Code).
Repealed article 3836 is now codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions,
the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent
that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under sub-
section (b) of this section .
92. 725 F.2d at 292.
93. Id. at 291.
94. 741 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1984).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
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section 522 did not apply to her case.96
The Reagan court also resolved the question of whether the retirement
fund qualified as a spendthrift trust that would not pass into the debtor's
estate. Citing its opinion in Goff v. Taylor97 the court held that Texas law
does not protect trusts created by a settlor for his own benefit, while trusts
created for a beneficiary that contain a spendthrift clause are protected, since
the former is specifically assignable under Texas law and the latter is not.98
The court held that the assignable nature of the debtor's trust prevented it
from being excluded from the debtor's estate in bankruptcy. 99
A third issue presented in Reagan was whether the fact that the debtor
had no right to possession of the fund until after retirement rendered the
credit union's claim unenforceable. The court determined that the security
agreement could become enforceable without the employee first becoming
entitled to the funds. 100 Although section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 10 1
states that a court shall not allow a claim that is unenforceable, contingent,
or unmatured against the debtor or his property, the court nevertheless de-
cided that the credit union's claim was currently enforceable in that the
debtor possessed a legal right of assignment and vested future rights in the
fund. 102 The court admitted that the credit union could not convert its se-
curity interest into cash before the debtor's retirement, but stated that the
credit union was "entitled above all other claimants to assert in bankruptcy
its security interest in the assigned fund". 103
During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit also considered the issue of
whether a debtor in bankruptcy could retain a life insurance annuity pursu-
ant to section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 1° 4 In Johnson v. Fen-
slage10 5 the Fifth Circuit held that such a fund did not constitute a
spendthrift trust because it was voluntary and terminable at will. 10 6 The
debtor in Johnson also attempted to use the Texas State College and Univer-
sity Employees Uniform Insurance Benefits Act 10 7 to obtain exemption of
the annuity. The court found, however, that the annuity was not exempt
under the Act unless the educational institution contributed to the annu-
ity.10 8 The debtor also failed to obtain an exemption under article 21.22 of
the Texas Insurance Code, which provides that insurance benefits or annui-
ties paid on a periodic basis are not attachable. 109 The terms of the debtor's
96. 741 F.2d at 97.
97. (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
98. 741 F.2d at 97; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
99. 741 F.2d at 97.
100. Id. at 98.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1982).
102. 741 F.2d at 98.
103. Id.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
105. 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1984).
106. Id. at 1140.
107. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-3, § 9(a) (Vernon 1981). The Act provides ex-
emption for insurance payments, benefits, and other transactions made pursuant to the act.
108. 724 F.2d at 1141.
109. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon 1981).
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annuity allowed payments in a lump sum, however, and for this reason the
court refused to exempt the insurance annuity.110
In Davidson Texas, Inc. v. Garcia11 1 a judgment creditor attempted to gar-
nish property that allegedly constituted exempt current wages for personal
services.' 12 The creditor, after losing at the trial court level, argued on ap-
peal that the funds constituted payment for work performed in an independ-
ent contractor relationship.' 1 3 The court, however, noted language from a
previous decision that stated that the test is whether the employer controlled
not only what shall be done but how it shall be done, and found under the
facts that the appellee was an employee and thus entitled to exemption of the
funds as his current wages. 114
In Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Loomis 15 a judgment creditor sought to
subject the appellee's homestead to satisfaction of the judgment. The credi-
tor sought the value in the exempt homestead that was in excess of the con-
stitutionally protected amount as of the date the property was purchased.1 16
A constitutional amendment increased the exemption from $5,000 to
$10,000 in 1970,117 after the defendant acquired the property but before the
appellant's judgment. The jury found the value to be less than the amended
limit but in excess of the original amount protected. The court ruled that
the increased exemption amount was to be applied retroactively and denied
the relief sought.' 18
In Hennigan v. Hennigan119 an attorney, against whom another attorney
had obtained a judgment for unpaid fees, claimed that fees owed to him for
legal services rendered constituted exempt wages for personal services. The
court noted that the term "current wages" implies an employer-employee or
master-servant relationship and excludes compensation due to an independ-
ent contractor.120 The court of appeals ruled that retainer fees and bills for
services performed at hourly rates were amounts owed for work performed
as an independent contractor and thus were not exempted current wages. 12'
110. 724 F.2d at 1142.
I 1. 664 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
112. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966). The statute exempts cur-
rent wages for personal services from garnishment.
113. 664 S.W.2d at 792.
114. Id. at 794. The court had previously set forth the relationship test in Brasher v. Car-
nation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ dism'd).
115. 672 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. The provision in effect at the time of purchase, TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 51 (1876,
amended 1970), exempted $5000.
117. See id.
118. 672 S.W.2d at 310-11.
119. 666 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (per
curiam).
120. Id. at 324.
121. Id. at 324-25; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (current wages not subject to garnish-
ment); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Graham, 22 S.W. 1101, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1889, no writ)
(fees due an attorney for services rendered are not exempt from garnishment).
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IV. CREDITORS' RIGHTS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE
During the survey period several opinions underscored the effect of the
Bankruptcy Code on creditors' rights in Texas. In Henke Grain Co. v. Kee-
nan122 the appellant filed a motion for new trial in state district court after
the cause had been removed to federal bankruptcy court, but before the
bankruptcy court's remand. The state appellate court faced the question of
whether the appellant's bankruptcy filing and subsequent removal meant
that the district court had no authority to receive the motion for new trial,
resulting in a failure to perfect the appeal. In resolving the issue, the court
asserted that although the removal suspended the district court's authority
to rule on the motion for new trial, it did not impair an appellant's ability to
file such a motion. 123 The court ruled that the motion remained pending
until remand. 124 If thereafter the moving party failed to act on the motion,
the motion would be overruled by operation of law.125
The effect of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code' 26 was
at issue in Wallen v. State,127 in which the state brought suit for unpaid gross
receipts taxes against a debtor and the insurance company that executed
bonds to secure payment of the debtor's taxes. The district court entered a
judgment in favor of the state, and the debtor, on appeal, contended that he
had received service of citation during the pendency of the automatic stay in
bankruptcy. The appellate court held that the citation was the type of action
that was subject to the automatic stay provision and was, therefore, void and
without any legal effect. 128
In McDonald v. Burrows129 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's
decision denying the petitioners' habeas corpus relief, in which the petition-
ers faced criminal charges for violation of Minnesota securities laws. The
court stated that the All Writs Act130 afforded the debtor no protection,
citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Barnette v. Evans,3 in which the
court explained that "[t]he purpose of bankruptcy is to protect those in fi-
nancial, not moral, difficulty." 132 The McDonald court also relied upon the
Younger Doctrine, 33 which provides that federal courts may not enjoin
state criminal proceedings unless the proceedings present a great and imme-
diate danger to the plaintiff's federally protected rights. 134 The court noted
122. 658 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
123. Id. at 346.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). Section 362 acts to stay certain actions during the pen-
dency of bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
127. 667 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
128. Id. at 623; see 11 U.S.C. 362(1), (6) (1982) (staying acts to collect, assess, or recover
claims from debtor).
129. 731 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 173, 83 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1984).
130. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1982). Section 1651 authorizes federal courts to issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions. Id. § 1651.
131. 673 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 1251.
133. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
134. 731 F.2d at 298.
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that the debtor had no federal right to have his debts administered through a
bankruptcy court. 135
In Howard v. Howard136 the court granted a default judgment on a bill of
review filed by appellee and four days thereafter appellee filed bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court lifted automatic stay, 137 and the question raised was
whether the default judgment had become a final order because of appel-
lants' failure to file a motion for new trial until after the bankruptcy court
lifted automatic stay, long after the deadline for filing such motion absent a
bankruptcy intervention. 138 The trial court granted the motion for new trial,
and the appellate court agreed that the motion, filed nine days after the expi-
ration of the automatic stay, was timely filed due to the operation of section
108(c) of the Code, which allows thirty days after the termination of the
automatic stay to commence or continue civil actions. 139
The ability of a bankruptcy court to estimate the value of a creditor's
contingent and unliquidated claim was reaffirmed in Addison v. Langston,140
in which the court dealt with over 1,200 on-call contracts held by creditors.
Texas law allows the nondefaulting party to such a contract to fix a reason-
able price for damages when the other party defaults. 14 1 The Fifth Circuit,
however, believed that the bankruptcy court had clearly not abused its dis-
cretion by estimating the value of these contracts as of the date of bank-
ruptcy, rather than some later date that would have provided the creditors
with a higher market value for their contracts. 142
The Internal Revenue Service successfully challenged the ability of a
debtor to settle a claim with a non-priority creditor outside of a plan of
reorganization in United States v. AWECO, Inc. 143 The debtor proposed a
settlement of a pending unsecured claim. The proposed settlement called for
transfer of certain of the debtor's assets that secured a tax claim of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, as well as that of another secured creditor. Over the
objection of the IRS and the secured party, the bankruptcy court approved
the settlement, and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion. The Fifth Circuit, in remanding the case for additional factual evi-
dence on the issues of the fairness and equity of the proposed settlement,
determined that the "fair and equitable" standard is a term of art meaning
135. Id. at 298-99; see United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1982) (federal
court may require offender to make restitution to victim, though debt is discharged in
bankruptcy).
136. 670 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
137. The bankruptcy filing automatically invokes the stay provisions of the code. See II
U.S.C. § 362 (1982); see supra note 126. Section 362(d) grants creditors the right to request
that the stay be lifted. Id. § 362(d).
138. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. The rule sets a 30-day time limit for filing a motion for new
trial. Id.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1982).
140. 737 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1984).
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
142. 737 F.2d at 1340-41; see II U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982) (allowing estimation of contin-
gent or unliquidated claims that hinder closing the case).




that senior interests are to be given priority over junior interests. 144 The
court ruled that a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in approving settle-
ments with a junior creditor unless the court concludes that priority of pay-
ment will be respected as to objecting senior creditors. 145 The decision has
been hotly debated among bankruptcy experts who are concerned with the
possible ramifications that the AWECO decision might have on a debtor's
flexibility in arriving at a successful rehabilitation of its financial problems.
V. ESTABLISHING AND COLLECTING CLAIMS
A. Foreclosure
In Longview Savings & Loan Association v. Nabours14 6 homeowners
sought to enjoin a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a deed of trust lien
and to recover damages for violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. 147 The borrowers had attempted to obtain lender approval of the trans-
fer of their property to a third party who had arranged "wrap-around" fi-
nancing. The lender advised that any transfer must result in an assumption
by the purchaser of the existing loan, or such transfer would be without the
lender's consent and would, therefore, constitute a default. 148 The lender's
attorney recommended against closing the sale but did not indicate to the
borrower that the lender would enforce the consent clause. After closing the
lender accepted payments from the borrower for five months with no objec-
tion. The appellate court agreed with the jury's findings that the lender had
waived its rights to declare and to enforce a default pursuant to the consent
clause on the basis of the borrower's failure to obtain the lender's acceptance
of the transfer. 149
The Corpus Christi court of appeals in Cortez v. Brownsville National
Bank 5 0 dealt with the type and sufficiency of prior notice of an intended
foreclosure. In an action brought by the borrower to set aside a trustee's
deed given at a foreclosure sale, the court ruled that for a foreclosure sale
under a deed of trust to be valid, absent a contrary agreement, waiver, or
exceptional circumstance, the lender must have given two types of notice:
first, notice of intent to accelerate prior to exercising the option to accelerate;
and second, actual notice of acceleration. 1 5' The court found that in the
instant case the note had the necessary language waiving the requirement of
notice of intent to accelerate, thus validating the lender's action of only send-
144. 725 F.2d at 298; see SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965).
145. 725 F.2d at 298.
146. 673 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ granted).
147. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
148. The pertinent provision in the mortgage read: "The Grantors further agree that they
will not make any voluntary inter vivos transfer of the premises. . . without first obtaining the
written consent of the mortgagee. Any such transfer, if the mortgagee shall not so consent,
shall constitute a default .... "673 S.W.2d at 359.
149. Id. at 361.
150. 664 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
151. Id. at 809; see Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982);
Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 865-66 (Tex. 1975).
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ing notice of acceleration. 15 2
B. Garnishment and Setoff
The Tyler court of appeals dealt with the issue of the validity of a judg-
ment in a garnishment action based upon the finality of the judgment on the
underlying debt in Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd. 153 The judg-
ment creditors in Taylor had obtained a judgment in a garnishment action
and sought to execute on this garnishment award during the pendency of an
appeal of the main judgment, out of which the garnishment proceeding
arose. The appellate court held that the trial court lost its jursidiction in the
main lawsuit by reason of the appeal; therefore, the trial court necessarily
lost jurisdiction to render a judgment in the ancillary garnishment action
pending the appeal.' 54 The court of appeals also stated, however, that if the
judgment is affirmed on appeal, the court retains its jurisdiction over the
ancillary proceeding. 1 5 The court distinguished the rule that permits the
issuance of a writ of garnishment on the date of the signing of a debt judg-
ment when a supersedeas bond is not procured.' 5 6 The court concluded that
this rule only allows the creditor to seize, impound, and have first priority to
the judgment debtor's funds pending final disposition of the appeal of the
main cause.' 57
In Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Bank v. Dallas Bank & Trust Co.' 58 the
assignee of a certificate of deposit, as endorsee and holder in due course,
sought payment of the certificate from the issuing bank that claimed a right
of setoff against the certificate to the extent of the purchase money debt the
certificate purchaser owed to the issuing bank. The appellate court, in af-
firming summary judgment granted in favor of the assignee, held that the
issuing bank's security interest in the purchaser's deposit accounts failed to
give a security interest in the funds allocable to the certificate.' 59 The court
did not permit the setoff because the demand that the bank held against the
debtor (purchaser) was not matched at the time of the attempted setoff by
any demand the debtor had against the bank, thus failing the test applied to
attempted setoffs that the demands must mutually exist between the same
parties. 160
152. 664 S.W.2d at 810.
153. 670 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
154. Id. at 419; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966) (providing who
may issue writs of garnishment and when).
155. 670 S.W.2d at 419.
156. Id. at 420; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 657.
157. 670 S.W.2d at 420. But see Northshore Bank v. Commercial Credit Corp., 668
S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (dates of issuance of
writs cannot be used to prioritize multiple claims to a fund when such writs were issued prior
to finality of judgment).
158. 667 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
159. Id. at 574-75; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(specifically excluding certificates of deposit from the definition of "deposit account").
160. 667 S.W.2d at 575; see Western Shoe Co. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 369, 373,




Renger Memorial Hospital v. State161 presented the court with the issue of
whether a cause of action held by a judgment debtor was a property right
assignable in a turnover proceeding.1 62 The court rendered judgment in
favor of the state against the defendant, and the state commenced an ancil-
lary action for turnover of a cause of action possessed by the defendant
against its former directors. The appellate court ruled that all property, in-
cluding present or future rights to property, not exempt from seizure for
satisfaction of liabilities is subject to turnover and found the cause of action
to be such a property right capable of turnover.1 63
In a complicated fact situation, conflicting claims of ownership of alleg-
edly converted oil field equipment were resolved in 3-C Oil Co. v. Modesta
Partnership. 164 Various parties asserted rights to the equipment by virtue of:
(a) the purchase of the underlying oil and gas leases at a sheriff's sale, there-
fore claiming the equipment as fixtures; (b) the issuance of a writ of execu-
tion, levy of the writ on the equipment, and purchase at the subsequent sale
of the property by the United States Marshal; (c) the issuance of a writ of
execution, levy of the writ on the equipment, but no subsequent sale; and
(d) an assignment from the owner (judgment debtor) prior to any levy
and/or sale by any of the other claimants. 165 The 3-C Oil court ruled that
no title passed to the purchaser of the oil and gas leases because the equip-
ment was not a fixture; no title passed to the purchaser of the equipment at
the marshal's sale because the judgment debtor did not have title to the
equipment at the time the writ of execution was levied; the other creditor
who levied upon the property held no title to the equipment because no exe-
cution sale had taken place, making this creditor merely a legal custodian of
whatever interest the judgment debtor possessed; and the assignee, whose
assignment from the judgment debtor occurred prior to any levy of a writ of
execution, held title to the equipment.1 66
In Ortiz v. M & M Sales Co. 167 a judgment creditor sued a sheriff and his
surety for damages caused by the sheriff's delay in issuing a writ of execution
on real property of the debtor. The judgment defendant filed for bankruptcy
two days after the creditor gave notice to the sheriff of the existence of real
property to be levied upon. The trial court held the sheriff liable for his
failure to levy the writ of execution. The sheriff avoided liability on appeal,
however, because of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
161. 674 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
162. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (court may order
judgment debtor to turn over property to satisfy the judgment).
163. 674 S.W.2d at 830; see also Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470, 472
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (cause of action for damages is assignable unless
expressly forbidden by statute).
164. 668 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. Id. at 744-46.
166. Id. at 748-50.
167. 656 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3825 (Vernon 1966) (sheriffs held liable for failure to levy immediately
on property after notice.
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that would have prevented the sheriffs ultimate sale pursuant to a levy of the
writ of execution. 168
D. Tax Sales-Redemption
The issue of a taxpayer's right to redeem property lost for nonpayment of
taxes assessed under the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act 169 was
raised in Wells v. Fenley.170 In Wells the purchaser of the property sold at a
sheriff's sale brought suit to quiet title against the taxpayer. The taxpayer
asserted a right of redemption under section 34.21 of the Texas Property Tax
Code, 17 1 which became effective on January 1, 1982. All of the taxpayer's
acts of redemption, however, occurred in 1981. At the time in question,
therefore, only property lost for nonpayment of ad valorem taxes could be
redeemed.' 72 Hence, the Property Code provision was inapplicable, and the
court quieted title in favor of the sheriff's sale purchaser. 73
E. Reclamation
In United States v. Westside Bank174 a statutory interpleader was brought
to determine the proper distribution of proceeds of a foreclosure sale. The
district court denied the priority status claim of a credit seller. The seller
based its claim on a right of reclamation. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's order, finding that a seller of goods does retain a priority
status to the extent of traceable proceeds from the sale of those goods if all
requirements of section 2.702 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code' 75
have been met. The court also noted that the seller must have diligently
pursued the right of reclamation created under that section. 176
F. Abstract of Judgment
The court in Reynolds v. Kessler 177 reviewed a suit to remove a cloud on
title resulting from a purported federal judgment lien based on an allegedly
defective abstract of judgment. 78 The judgment creditor challenged the trial
court's judgment in favor of the property owner on the basis that the Texas
168. 656 S.W.2d at 556. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 647, which requires a sheriff to post a notice
of a sale of real property pursuant to the levy of a writ of execution for three weeks in a
newspaper in the county where the property is located.
169. Ch. 24, 1961 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 71, repealed by Act of June 13,
1979, ch. 841, § 6, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2329-30.
170. 668 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.21 (Vernon 1982).
172. See 668 S.W.2d at 926.
173. Id.; see also Alamo Land & Sugar Co. v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist.
No. 2, 276 S.W. 949, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ) (right of redemption
does not exist unless specifically granted).
174. 732 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1984).
175. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.702 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
176. 732 F.2d at 1265.
177. 669 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1984, no writ).
178. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 (1982) (regarding the creation and registration of federal
judgment liens); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 52.003-.004 (Vernon 1984) (requirements
for a valid Texas abstract of judgment and proper recordation).
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law on requirements for abstracting a judgment did not pertain to a federal
court judgment lien. The court, however, ruled that the statute providing
that an abstract of judgment rendered in Texas by any United States court
may be recorded and indexed in the same manner as provided for judgments
of courts of Texas, 179 when read in conjunction with the federal statute pro-
viding for registration of judgments of other districts, results in uniform
treatment of state and federal judgments. 180 The federal abstract in question
failed to state the date of judgment and the rate of interest specified in the
judgment. The court concluded that the failure to state the date of the judg-
ment was alone fatal to the creation of the judgment lien, despite actual
notice of the defective record.' 8' The court, therefore, held that the abstract
was so improperly recorded that it created no lien. 182
179. 669 S.W.2d at 805; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.007 (Vernon 1984).
180. 669 S.W.2d at 805.
181. Id. at 804-06.
182. Id.
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